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RETHINKING REDSIEGE INFORMATION SECURITY

WHO IS MIKE SAUNDERS

Principal Security Consultant

- 25 Years Experience
 - Penetration Testing
 - Red Teaming
 - IT and Security Expertise
 - System Admin
 - Network Admin
 - Blue Team
 - Development
 - Security Architecture
- Tool Developer
- Technical Blog Writer
- Black Hat Trainer
- Photographer, Musician, Hiker



Before we get started, does anyone want to get out?

meme-arsenal.ru



WHYAMOHEREP

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imgflip.com



Pen Testing is **BROKEN**

- Traditional network pen tests don't represent how attackers operate
 - Start with host inside the network
 - Focused on coverage vs. depth
 - Noisy scans
 - Most attackers already have credentials (phishing/code execution)
- On the positive side most likely to identify missing patches



A Better Way?

- Simulate how real attackers might operate
 - Assumed Breach
 - Purple Teams
 - Red Teams



So...Many...Terms... Purple Team Adversarial Attack Simulation Threat Modeling Adversary Simulation Threat Emulation Attack Simulation Red Team Comprehensive Testing



Red Team Terms

- Attack Simulation
- Adversarial Attack Simulation
- Threat Emulation
- Red Team
- Comprehensive Testing

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Red Team?

- Emulate an advanced threat actor
 - Phishing / Vishing / Smishing
- Attempt to evade detection
- Establish persistence, lateral movement, privesc
- Usually goal focused
- Long campaigns typically 6+ weeks
- Tests defenders, not detections



WHAT CLIENTS SEE WHEN IT COMES TO RED TEAMING

THE RESEARCH

THE RED TEA

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@ZephrFish

MA



Pros & Cons: Red Team

• Pro

- Better understanding of resilience against determined attacker
- Ability to model real-world TTPs
- Con
 - Expensive
 - Campaigns are long 6+ weeks
 - Requires R&D time for payload and ruse development
 - Attackers have unlimited time, we don't





Pros & Cons: Red Team

• More Con

- Red Teams aren't threading a needle. They're threading multiple.
 - Protecting infrastructure (Netcraft, etc.)
 - Email filters (M365, ProofPoint, etc.)
 - Getting the right ruse to the right user on the right day
 - Code execution
 - Establishing persistence
 - Staying hidden
- Requires significant maturity to realize value



Assumed Breach

- Assume an endpoint is already compromised & org is breached
- Zero or full knowledge
- Starts on typical end user workstation or with remote access
 - What data can an attacker access?
 - What systems can an attacker access?



Assumed Breach Goals

• Focus on coverage = overt testing

- No attempts to evade
- Focus on testing detections = covert testing
 - What do security systems see and alert on?





Pros & Cons: AB

• Pro

- Better understanding of strengths and weaknesses
- Ability to model real-world TTPs
- Con
 - Limited time = faster tempo, more noise
 - Not focused on vulnerabilities
 - Non-representative accounts/workstations can negatively impact results



Purple Team

- Sometimes threat emulation emulate a specific attacker, or specific agreed upon techniques
- Highly-collaborative test between blue and red teams -> Purple
- Focused on specific objectives / goals
 - Test assumptions
 - Validate detections & security investment
 - Identify visibility gaps
 - Identify gaps in processes



Pros & Cons: Purple

• Pro

- Confirm detections and defenses
- Confirm attack visibility
- Collaborative & reactive

• Con

- Not focused on vulnerabilities
- Not necessarily focused on extent of ability to spread/escalate
- Blue team may need to respond to actual incidents



A Better Way



AB – TWO(ish) MODELS

- Compromised user
- Malicious user (insider threat)
- Both use standard workstation image with representative user accounts
 - Preferably a recently terminated user & their workstation
 - Backup option user cloned from active user, machine from gold image



Compromised USER – PATH A

- Simulate a user who executed on a custom payload
- Ops take place over C2 framework
 - Can execute with remote access or ship payload to client
 - Pivot to remote access with creds



Compromised USER – PATH B

- Operate on workstation
 - Shipped laptop / VPN + RDP / on site
- Work with tools available on desktop or what can be loaded
 - Initiate C2 if needed

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AV/EDR – DISABLED?

- Any AV/EDR can be bypassed given time
- Is it worth client \$\$\$ to spend time to develop bypass?
- Discuss goals with client
- @HackingLZ Start with AV/EDR enabled, verify bypass or visibility of actions, then disable if needed
 - Have this discussion before the test starts
 - If protections will be disabled, where and when



It's Time to Buy



INITIAL CONTACT & SCOPE

- What are your goals?
 - Test detections and controls
 - Identify misconfigurations
 - Identify vulnerabilities
 - What can an attacker access
 - Can we detect lateral movement
 - Compliance checkmark
- What is your budget?
- How much time / how many resources can you dedicate?





Program maturity



Tell me the truth...I'm...I'm ready to hear it.

YOU DON'T NEED A RED TEAM ASSESSMENT. YOU NEED TO MASTER THE BASICS.



Questions?

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- https://redsiege.com/discord
- https://redsiege.com/wednesday-offensive/
- Slides: https://redsiege.com/rethink





OFFENSIVE SERVICES. OFFENSIVE MINDS





RANSOMWARE **READINESS ASSESSMENT**

RED TEAM & ADVERSARY EMULATION

PURPLE TEAM & TRAINING

OUR OFFENSE PREPARES YOUR DEFENSE